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The recent increase in patenting by university researchers has concerned observers asking if
increased patenting is associated with less open publication of research results by university
researchers. Access to university-based research knowledge is critical to innovation in many areas
of industry. As university researchers increasingly patent their research results, the availability
of these results to follow-on innovators may be aﬀected. Patenting may increase dissemination
of knowledge through public disclosure. However, many researchers have expressed concern that
the increased focus on patenting and commercialization is compromising the historically open
nature of university research or that university research in patentable areas is crowding out
research in more basic science. Only limited empirical evidence exists regarding the relationship
between patenting and publishing by university researchers. Our study adds to this limited
evidence with an empirical investigation based on a panel data set for a very broad sample of
university researchers. Results indicate that publication production by university researchers
does not decrease with patent inventorship, and in fact increases signiﬁcantly. Analysis of the
average number of citations to a researcher’s publications by future publications indicates that
papers published in the year of a patent application are cited more heavily, but this relationship
is not robust to controlling for the count of that year’s publications by the researcher, suggesting
that the positive relationship is related to quality of research rather than patenting itself. Further
research on citations to patent-related publication is needed to explore these results.
JEL Classiﬁcations: I28, 031, 032, 038
Keywords: Intellectual property policy; Management of Technology; University patenting
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11 Introduction
Industry innovation often depends on accessing knowledge that exists outside of the ﬁrm. Sig-
niﬁcant literature describes the importance of access to university research for the industrial R&D
process (for example see [Mansﬁeld, 1991, 1995, 1998]). To varying degrees, respondents in all
industries reported that a signiﬁcant percentage of their product and process innovations could
not have been developed without academic research, or would have been substantially delayed.
University research was reported as an importance source of new projects for 31% of respondents
and an importance source of information for 36% of respondents [Cohen et al., 2002]. In other
words, industry research relies on university research for inputs to the research process. Accessing
and incorporating university research knowledge is therefore critical to the industrial innovation
process. This reliance on university research is growing over time [Mansﬁeld, 1998, Narin et al.,
1997]. In 1988, 73% of papers cited in U.S. industry patents were from public sources, authored
at academic, governmental, and other public institutions [Narin et al., 1997]. Industrial innovation
clearly depends on information originating at universities.
The transfer of this knowledge between universities and ﬁrms is therefore crucial to the industrial
innovation process. In their survey of R&D managers across many industries, Cohen et al. [2002]
ﬁnd that the most important channel for knowledge transfer from universities or government labs
is publication of the research, followed by informal exchange, public meetings or conferences, and
consulting. Patents were ranked as one of the least importance transfer channels.1 These ﬁnding
suggest the relative importance of open science for the transfer of research knowledge between
universities and industry as compared to patents.
University research has traditionally been associated with norms of open and rapid disclosure
of research results and an environment of knowledge sharing, co-authorship, and joint projects that
contribute to cumulative learning and innovation [Dasgupta and David, 1994]. The reward system
for faculty provides incentives for being ﬁrst to discover and disclose new research results, and
valuable reputations are built based on diﬀusion of these results among the scientiﬁc community.
Faculty members therefore have the incentive to disclose research results openly and quickly [David,
1998, David et al., 1992]. These activities stimulate the cumulative research process by facilitating
the transfer of knowledge among researchers. These norms and incentives are being challenged by
the increasing commercial value associated with university research results as patenting by faculty
members increases. As compared with other faculty in the same ﬁeld, entrepreneurial life sciences
faculty were more likely to deny requests for information from other researchers [Louis et al.,
2001, Campbell et al., 2002], indicating the negative inﬂuence of involvement in commercialization
activities on openness of the researchers. In addition, companies that support academic research
often require the academic institution to keep proprietary information conﬁdential for longer than
necessitated by the patent ﬁling [Blumenthal et al., 1996b, Rahm, 1995]. Many academic researchers
delay publications in order to keep information private, especially when sponsored by industry
1The pharmaceutical industry stands in contrast to these generalization, with less reliance on public science and
more knowledge transfer through the information disclosed in patents.
1funding [Blumenthal et al., 1996a].
There is reason to believe that the inﬂuence of patenting and commercialization activity on
university researchers has grown in recent years. Since the late 1970s, the university research envi-
ronment has changed dramatically. Policy changes, such as the Bayh-Dole Act of 19802, encouraged
commercialization of university research results by standardizing policies granting intellectual prop-
erty rights to university researchers for outcomes of federally-funded research.3 At the time, federal
funded research made up approximately 70% of university research.4 In addition, sources of aca-
demic research funding shifted substantially from the 1970s to the 1980s to include more industry
funding and less government funding [Mansﬁeld, 1995]. Industry funding of university research in-
creased from $630 million to $1.896 billion between 1985 and 1998, university-industry joint R&D
centers grew 60% during the 1980s, and the number of university oﬃces of technology transfer
increased more than 800% between 1980 and 1995 [Cohen et al., 2002]. Universities underwent
organizational changes to attempt to better promote the commercialization of university research
results [Argyres and Leibeskind, 1998].
In response to these policy and market changes, patenting by university researchers has increased
dramatically in the last two decades. This increase has been documented in existing research
(for example see Henderson et al 1998). Prior to 1981, fewer than 250 patents were issued to
universities each year. This increased to almost 1,600 patents in just over a decade (The Council
on Governmental Relations, 1993). This increase in patenting volume was accompanied by a
signiﬁcant increase in the number of universities that were patenting innovations. Following the
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, many universities that previously held few if any patents became
patent holders.5 As documented by Henderson et al. [1998], the 96 patents issued to universities in
1965 went to just 28 universities, while the almost 1500 patents granted to universities in 1992 went
to over 150 U.S. universities. Providing researchers with the incentive to patent their ﬁndings may
encourage commercialization of research ﬁndings, as intended by the Bayh-Dole Act. However,
the increased focus on patenting may also lead to increased secrecy, delayed publication, and a
change in research focus among researchers, decreasing the availability of knowledge to others in
the research community. The overall impact of faculty patenting of university research results on
knowledge transfer between university and industry depends on the relationship between patenting
2Patent and Trademark Act Amendments (P.L. 96-517)
3See Jaﬀe [2000] and Mowery and Ziedonis [2001] for a more extensive history of the policy changes.
4University faculty members do hold patents from prior to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act. Some of these
inventions were not patented through the university (i.e. they were patented by ﬁrms with which the faculty member
worked or they were patented by the faculty person individually and not assigned to the university). However, even
before the Bayh-Dole Act, universities could and did patent some inventions from faculty research. For example,
the famous Cohen and Boyer patent was applied for in 1979 and is assigned to Stanford University. The importance
of the Bayh-Dole Act is that it streamlined and standardized the rights of universities with respect to intellectual
property stemming from federally funded research.
5Mowery and Ziedonis [2001] ﬁnd that of the 224 universities with patents issued after 1980, 51 universities had
10 or more issued patents applied for between 1970 and 1980, 92 universities had fewer than 10 issued patents during
1970-1980, and 81 universities has no patents issued during 1970 - 1980. This indicates the signiﬁcant entry of
inexperienced and less experienced universities into the pool of patenting universities.
2and other knowledge transfer mechanisms, such as publications.
Our research investigates the relationship between university faculty members’ publication and
patenting activities at the researcher level. Speciﬁcally, we explore the relationship between inven-
torship on a patent and the production of publications and citation to these publications using panel
data covering a broad set of university faculty inventors. We develop a matched sample of non-
patenting faculty researchers, and employ researcher-level ﬁxed eﬀects to estimate the relationship
between patenting and annual publications or average citations to publications. The one existing
empirical study that attempts to uncover the relationship between publishing and patenting is
Agrawal and Henderson [2002], which examines the patenting and publishing of faculty members
in two departments at MIT (Mechanical and Electrical Engineering). The authors ﬁnd that the
level of patenting is not predictive of the level of publications, but that the number of citations to
publications is positively related to the level of patenting, which they interpret as evidence that
patenting is positively correlated with the impact of research.
This research extends the work of Agrawal and Henderson in several ways. First, MIT is
likely to be an institution without many peers, in terms of research quality, links to industry, and
patent experience. Second, the examination of only two departments limits the generalizability of
previous ﬁndings. As discussed below, our research uses a broad sample drawn from the population
of university inventors, across all ﬁelds and universities, with a dataset coving 21 years. Third,
we investigate the diﬀerential impacts of university, industry, and unassigned patents, as well as
exploring diﬀerences across the importance of the patents, as measured using forward citation
counts. Fourth, we employ a matched-sample that allows us to explicitly examine changes in the
diﬀerence between publications of patenting and similar non-patenting faculty members. Finally,
our analysis controls for current researcher quality diﬀerently than this existing work and results
suggest that these controls are important.
Results presented here indicate that publication activity is positively related to patenting by a
faculty members, especially for university-assigned or very important patents, but that this positive
relationship declines with an increasing number of cumulative patents by the faculty researcher.
This evidence suggests that faculty researchers are not limiting the open publication of research
results as they patent, indicating the complementarity between these research outputs. Results
of the analysis of average citations to faculty publications indicate that the publications in the
year of a patent application are cited more heavily, but there is no signiﬁcant relationship between
past patenting and citations to current publications. The positive relationship between current
patenting and citations to publications is sensitive to the inclusion of a count of current publications,
suggesting that the increase in citation should not be attributed to the patenting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section considers the possible
eﬀects of the increased patenting on university faculty publishing. Section 3 describes our sample
and data, summary statistics of which are reported in Section 4. Section 5 presents our empirical
strategy and results. Conclusions are provided in Section 6.
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2 How Are Patents and Publications Related?
We focus our study at the researcher level, allowing us to explore individual trade-oﬀs and
complementarities between patenting and publication for faculty researchers. The production of
publications by a faculty member may be positively or negatively related to the patenting activity
of that person. These relationships are categorized and summarized in Table 1, and discussed
further below. Note that this conceptualization is implicitly conditional on the faculty researcher
remaining in academia.6
2.1 Patenting and publishing may be positively related
University researchers may experience some complementarities between patenting and pub-
lishing. First and foremost, the same research stream may naturally lead to publications and
yield patents. Faculty researchers interviewed by Agrawal and Henderson [2002] stated that “most
patentable research is also publishable,” and that the decision of whether or not to patent research
is something that happens after the research process, not in the selection of research projects. The
academic norm of rewarding priority in disclosure of research results provides the incentive for rapid
open publication of research results by faculty members [David, 1998]. Although patents may be
valued by the academic community, the reward structure remains primarily focused on publica-
tions.7 Therefore, faculty members with research results that are patentable and also publishable
6Career eﬀects of university patenting is a topic of future research.
7Carayol [2004] ﬁnds that the usual academic reward system does not provide incentives for patenting by faculty
members. “The reputational reward of patents within the academic community seems to be low: Career proﬁles and
4are likely to publish the results even if they are patented, although they may wait until the patent
application is ﬁled to submit the publication.8
In addition, the experience of patenting, licensing, and working with the licensee to trans-
fer technology may prompt additional research questions. As the licensee works to develop the
patented innovation, the university researcher may learn or may encounter challenges that point
to new research questions. Academic researchers report that problems they work on in academic
research often come from ideas and problems encountered during industrial consulting [Mansﬁeld,
1995]. Another survey of scientists reported that 65% of researchers reported that interaction with
industry has inﬂuenced their research. One respondent commented, “There is no doubt that work-
ing with industry scientists has made me a better researcher. They help me reﬁne my experiments
and sometimes have a diﬀerent perspective on a problem that sparks my own ideas” [Siegel et al.,
2003]. This involvement and feedback may produce additional publications, and potentially addi-
tional patents. University researcher involvement in commercialization activities may also provide
additional information to the researcher about the value of various research streams. Research
grants and consulting have, and continue to, serve this purpose in many academic settings. Ad-
ditional exposure to and interaction with commercialization and industry may supplement these
other indicators [Feller, 1990].
One could also imagine that patenting, and the associated possibility of licensing and industry
involvement, would allow a university researcher access to additional funding (either from licensing
revenue or industry funding) that he could spend on his research and lab expenses. The respondent
quoted above also stated, “Also, my involvement with ﬁrms has allowed me to purchase better
equipment for my lab, which means I can conduct more experiments,” [Siegel et al., 2003]. The
additional funding could allow for additional equipment, researchers, and junior faculty members,
all of which could contribute positively to the publications and patents produced by the lab. This
“pyramid eﬀect” of patents and publications produced under the supervision of a university re-
searcher whose name appears on many of the patents and publications generated complicates the
interpretation on a positive correlation between patenting and publishing.
Patenting of university research by a faculty member may also increase incentives for that
researcher to publish more articles related to the patented research. Publications may serve as
a type of advertisement, increasing the awareness and knowledgability of the relevant scientiﬁc
community with regard to the patented technology. This can raise the value of the patented
research because it increases the legitimacy of the technology and creates a set of researchers who
know about an may be interested in utilizing the patented research.
Patents and publications may be positively correlated without being causally linked. If “good”
researchers produce more and better research output, than these researchers will have more patents
and publications. Similarly, if the work of a researcher develops or improves over time, then the
patent production are not related,” [Carayol, 2004].
8A patenting MIT faculty member that we spoke with stated that there used to be conﬂict between open publication
and patenting, but that they had solved this by waiting to submit their publication until they submitted their patent
application.
5researcher may increase both patents and publications. Thus, the fact that higher numbers of
patents and publications are both indicators of researcher quality suggests that a positive correlation
would hold. In the empirical analysis that follows, we will attempt to control for researcher quality.
2.2 Patenting and publishing may be negatively related
There are several reasons that a university researcher involved in patenting might publish fewer
articles than he or she otherwise would have. These include time constraints, secrecy, and change
in research focus. The fact that a person only has so many work hours in a day means than any
research activity is done at the expense of something else. As researchers get more involved in the
patenting process, and spends time locating licensees for their patents or working with the licensee
to transfer the technology, time spent doing research may be compromised. The analysis here can
not explore the eﬀect of licensing or commercialization activities, because we do not have data on
these activities. However, these activities are likely to be positively correlated with patenting, and
therefore the relationship between patenting and publishing may be confounded by the inﬂuences
of licensing and commercialization activities. In addition, if the reward structure at universities
increases recognition of patents in hiring and tenure decisions, faculty members’ limited time may
be shifted toward patenting at the expense of publishing.
The monetary incentive for university researchers to patent research results provides some en-
couragement to do more applied, patentable work. Providing incentives to patent might drive
university research to focus more on patentable research — that is, more applied, shorter-term
research — at the expense of basic research. Princeton University President Harold Shapiro sug-
gested that the inﬂuence of industry funding is felt on campus research activities, stating, “much
of the research agenda is externally driven.”9 Blumenthal et al. [1986] found that faculty members
with industry funding were four times more likely to report that their choice of research was in-
ﬂuenced by the likelihood of commercializable results than were faculty members without industry
funding.10
As patenting of research results gains importance, researchers may elect to delay publication
in a journal or not publish at all in order to maintain secrecy around that particular innovation
and related research streams. Thursby and Thursby [2000] report that more than half of the ﬁrms
responding to their survey include delay of publication clauses in at least 90% of their university
contracts. Several surveys [Louis et al., 2001, Blumenthal et al., 1986, Campbell et al., 2002] have
found that industry funding, commercial goals, and patenting have led researchers to increase
secrecy with regard to research methodology and results. Blumenthal et al. [1996b] surveyed
companies that fund life sciences research at universities and found that 47% of the respondents
reported that their agreements with universities occasionally require that the university protect the
conﬁdentiality of research results for longer than is necessary for a patent application. Other survey
research by Blumenthal et al. [1996a] found that faculty sometimes themselves delay publication
9Newsday, October 8, 1989, “Higher Ed Takes the Low Road.”
10However, National Science Board data show that the share of university research categorized as basic remained
stable during the 1980s [Brooks and Randazzese].
6in order to protect the conﬁdentiality or ﬁnancial value of the results. This extends the desire for
secrecy from the research result being patented to related results, methodologies, and streams of
research. Greater desire for protecting the secrecy of research results on the part of faculty members
who participate in patenting and commercializing their research may lead them to reduce the open
publication of research results.
For the reasons discussed above, patents may be negatively or positively related to publication
activity by a university researcher. It may also be the case that the ﬁrst few patents by a researcher
provide many of the positive beneﬁts of patenting, such as interactions with industry researchers,
while faculty researcher who patent many of their research results may be aﬄicted with some of the
negative inﬂuences of patenting, such as limited time or industry capture. In order to investigate
this question, we develop a sample of faculty patenters and a control sample of faculty non-patenters,
as described below. The implicit null hypothesis is that the pattern of publications over time for a
faculty member is unrelated to that researcher’s patenting activity. We test the linear relationship
between patent and publications as well as the possible non-linear relationship that may exist if
the negative inﬂuences become more important as a faculty members patents more of his research
results.
3 Sample and Data
The empirical analysis relies on developing a sample of university researchers that have patented
their research results and a corresponding sample of university researchers that have not patented
research results. By collecting publication, citation, and patent count data for a long time period, we
are able utilize publication data on a given researcher over time, as well as compare that researcher
with the non-patenting control sample. The only other empirical research in this area has (1)
relied on only two departments at one (fairly exceptional) institution [Agrawal and Henderson,
2002], or (2) used a cross-sectional data set regarding patenting and publishing, and thus was
unable to investigate time eﬀects [Stephan et al., 2002]. In the ﬁrst case, the authors found no
evidence that patenting and publishing are complements or substitutes. In the second, the authors
conclude that patenting and publishing are complements. Our research develops and exploits a
more comprehensive dataset to further investigate the relationship.
3.1 Patenting and Publishing Data
This analysis requires two data sets: data on patents for all faculty members in the inventor
sample and data on publications and citations for all faculty members in both the inventor and
control samples. We have constructed these data sets from existing public sources, making new
use of data sets that have been exploited for other purposes elsewhere by combining patenting and
publication data at the individual research level with researcher characteristics.
The patent data is collected using the NBER patent databases [Hall et al., 2001]. Using in-
formation on the inventors, assignees, and citations to all U.S. utility patents applied for by the
7end of 1995, we create a panel data set of patent information for all inventors in our sample.
Because the inventor name data in this database is uncleaned, this required manually searching
the inventor database and identifying all permutations of a given name that were truly the same
inventor, and excluding others with similar or identical names. This was done by comparing the
address, assignee, and technology class for all patents potentially attributable to each inventor and
excluding those patents that did not ﬁt the proﬁle of the inventor in the sample. We also rely on
data sets identifying university-assigned patents from Arvids Ziedonis and Bhaven Sampat. With
this data, we identify each patent associated with an inventor in the sample as university-assigned,
unassigned, or industry assigned. For each inventor-sample faculty member, we assembled a panel
data set of the number of successful patents of each type applied for in each year (1975-1995).
For each inventor and control sample member, we construct a data set of the number of publi-
cations in each year from 1975 - 1995 and a count of future citations to each publication from the
Science Citation Index.11 As discussed further below, matching patent and publication data on the
time dimension is tricky. We follow Agrawal and Henderson [2002] matching the publication year
of articles with the application year of patents. In order to meet patent requirements, patenting
researchers do not want to publish their research prior to applying for the patent, so the publication
date will be later than the application date for related research, but the decision to publish may
be contemporaneous with the patent application.
For each member of the inventor and control sample, we also collect data on their ﬁeld, current
institution, the year in which they received their PhD, and the degree granting institution. The
ﬁrst two of these data items are collected from web searches. The Ph.D. date and institution
come primarily from the UMI International Digital Dissertations database, which includes records
of dissertations ﬁled since 1861, including author name, title, subject, Ph.D. granting institution,
and Ph.D. date. For faculty members that received their MD instead of Ph.D., we also use the
American Medical Association Physician Select, which provides biographical information on people
in the medical profession. Finally, for faculty that do not appear in either of these databases, we
relied on information from their web page or other web-based information.
3.2 Faculty-Inventor Sample
Our goal for the inventor sample is for the sample to represent the ﬁelds in which university
researchers were patenting in the approximate proportions that they were patenting relative to
others and not limit our sample to researchers at one or a few universities. This allows for a broad,
but unbiased, exploration of patenting behavior.
We draw the sample of university inventors from the NBER database of patents and inventors
[Hall et al., 2001]. For the 23,930 university-aﬃliated patents applied for between 1975 and 1995,
there are 26,880 unique ﬁrst name-last name combinations for inventors listed. Of these, there are
11,642 unique names that ever appear as the ﬁrst inventor on the patent.12 A random sample of
11The source we used is the ISI Web of Knowledge online at http://isi3.isiknowledge.com/portal.cgi/wos.
12We found that it was much easier to locate information on the ﬁrst inventors, which is why we use this in the
selection of the sample. This may introduce some bias. It is possible that being ﬁrst on a patent represents heading
8400 of these 11,642 inventors was selected. A closer examination of these names yielded a sample of
384 that were truly unique. Based on web searches of the inventor name and assignee institution,
we attempted to locate the inventor, conﬁrm that he or she is a faculty member, and collect
information on date of Ph.D., position held, gender, and departmental aﬃliation of the inventor.
Of these 384, 230 faculty inventors were found and conﬁrmed as faculty. Others were not found,
working in industry, non-faculty, retired or deceased prior to 1995, or located outside the U.S..
For each of the 230 remaining inventor sample members, we attempted to collect data on
publications and citations and Ph.D. date. A common name prevented collection of publication
data for 39 of these people, and no Ph.D. date information was available for 25 of them.
3.3 Control Sample
For each of the 166 remaining inventors in the sample, we select the faculty member in the
same department at the same institution with the closest Ph.D. date that IS NOT recorded as an
inventor on any patents.13 By matching the control sample based on institution and department,
we approximate a quality match as closely as possible.14 In addition, by matching at the institution
level, the inventor and control sample members are operating under the same institutional environ-
ment. As Owen-Smith and Powell [2001] describe, institutional characteristics strongly inﬂuence
the propensity of faculty members to patent. Matching on the PhD date allows approximate cohort
matching.
For each control member, we also collected information on publications and Ph.D. date. For 8
of the inventors, no acceptable match was available, and for 8 of the control members, a common
name prevented collection of publication data. In order to maintain our matched sample, dropping
these control member required also excluding the inventor match from the analysis. This left us
with a sample of 300 total researchers, evenly split between inventors and non-inventors.
4 Summary Statistics
By constructing the control sample to be as similar as possible (along observable dimensions)
to the inventor sample, we arrive at a well-matched pair of samples. The comparative summary
up the team of inventors, and so may also indicate some success in research. However, in some ﬁelds the lab directory
appears last on the patent. Correspondence with university inventors in several ﬁelds indicate that the meaning of
ﬁrst inventor varies by ﬁeld. It is true that university inventors who ever appear as the ﬁrst inventor on a patent are,
on average, inventors on more patents. For this reason, our sample can be seen as composed on university researchers
who are more heavily involved in patenting. This may limit the generalizability of our results.
13For each faculty member selected for the control sample, a search was done on the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Oﬃce (USPTO) website for matching inventors. If any inventors were found that could reasonably be assumed to
match the faculty member in question, based on name and location, a diﬀerent member of the same department at
the same institution was selected for the control sample. We also matched the faculty people based on position (i.e.
Professor, Associate Professor, etc.)
14This method of matched sample development is similar to that used, for example, by Trajtenberg et al. [1997] to
match university and corporate patents, by Almeida [1996] to match the patents of foreign and U.S. ﬁrms, and by
Remafedi et al. to match bisexual and homosexual high school students.
9Table 2: Summary of Inventor and Control Sample, 1975-1995
Inventors Non-Inventors
Number 150 150
Mean PhD Date 1973 1973
Percentage In:
Mechanical Engineering 7% 7%
Computer Science / Electrical Engineering 11% 11%
Medical 31% 31%
Chemistry 12% 12%
Biomedical / Genetics / Microbiology 17% 17%
Chemical Engineering / Materials Science 10% 10%
Physics 2% 2%
Other Science - plant and animal sciences 6% 6%
Behavioral, Philosophy, Cognitive Science 3% 3%
Percentage that are:
Professors 75% 76%
Assoc. Professors 11% 13%
Assistant Professors 0% 1%
Professors Emeritus 9% 7%
Research Professors 5% 4%
statistics for the control and inventor sample are reported in Table 2. We were able to match
the departmental aﬃliation and position closely, and the average time since PhD date also match
well. There may be some remaining concern that faculty members engaged in patenting during
their career may be doing inherently diﬀerent work than the faculty members than never patent,
resulting in unobserved heterogeneity across researchers in the sample. For example, patenting
faculty members may do more applied work than non-patenting faculty members in the same
department. In the analysis below, can control for unobserved heterogeneity using researcher-level
ﬁxed eﬀects. However, this admittedly misses diﬀerences between patenting and non-patenting
faculty members that change overtime.
We limit our observations to the year of and all years following the PhD date of each sample
member. This results in 5,461 observations at the researcher-year level. For the 1975–1995 sample
period, our data covers 1,545 patents by inventor sample inventors, 1184 of which are university
assigned, 274 are assigned to corporate entities, and 87 are unassigned. A histogram of the number
of patents held by the faculty inventors in our sample is displayed in Figure 1, the summary statistics
of the number of patent by type of assignee are reported in Table 3, and the average number of
patent held by inventors in each year are presented in Table 4. The distribution of the number of
patents from 1975–1995 is highly skewed toward 1 or a few patents (18 of the 150 faculty inventors
hold only 1 patents), while a few inventors hold many patents (5 faculty inventors hold 50 patents
or more, while only 1 holds more than 100 patents).15 Over the 1975–1995 period, the average
15The faculty member that holds more than 100 patents is a professor in the biochemistry department at the
10Table 3: Summary Statistics of Total Patents Per Faculty Inventor by Type
Min Max Mean Std. Dev
University Patents 1 117 7.9 12.6
Industry Patents 0 58 2.0 5.8
Unassign. Patents 0 25 0.6 2.4
All Patents 1 118 10.5 15.4
number of university patents per year per inventor increased from about 2 to greater than 3, while
the number of industry assigned patents increased slightly and the number of unassigned patents
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Figure 1: Histogram of Total Patents Per Inventor
For the 1975–1995 period, our data cover 17,063 publications and 812,996 citations for members
of the inventor and control sample. Figure 3 displays a histogram of the number of total publications
during this period held by sample faculty member. Although the distribution is skewed to the
left, it is ﬂatter and has more mass at the higher values than the histogram of patents above.16
Table 5 provides the annual and total summary statistics for the entire sample and by inventor
status. A diﬀerences of means test for the number of publications per year for inventors and
non-inventors suggests that those researchers holding a patent applied for between 1975 and 1995
publish signiﬁcantly more than non-inventors.17
University of Wisconsin. He holds 28 patents that were applied for prior to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act.
16This is consistent with the data summary reported by Agrawal and Henderson [2002], although the distribution
of publications in their sample is noticeably ﬂatter.
17Non-inventors publish on average 2.24 publications per year while inventors publish on average 3.99 publications
per year. The diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
11Table 4: Statistics of Total Annual Patents for Faculty Inventors
# inventors Mean Pats Per Inventor Std. Dev Min Max
1975 8 2.13 1.25 1 4
1976 13 2.31 2.36 1 8
1977 16 1.56 1.09 1 4
1978 16 1.94 1.39 1 6
1979 19 2.47 3.81 1 18
1980 20 1.85 1.79 1 8
1981 21 1.81 1.60 1 8
1982 23 1.26 0.54 1 3
1983 29 1.86 1.48 1 7
1984 29 1.83 1.56 1 7
1985 32 1.56 0.98 1 5
1986 30 1.60 1.25 1 6
1987 35 2.03 2.16 1 10
1988 49 1.96 2.11 1 13
1989 44 1.82 1.24 1 5
1990 55 1.73 0.99 1 5
1991 49 2.00 1.76 1 10
1992 67 2.01 2.23 1 15
1993 73 2.10 2.10 1 12
1994 79 2.20 1.88 1 10
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Figure 3: Histogram of Total Publications Per Researcher
Table 5: Patent and Publication Summary Statistics for Inventors and Non-Inventors
Inventors Non-Inventors Total
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Annual Pubs 3.99 5.18 2.24 2.96 3.12 4.32
Annual Pats 0.56 1.55 0 0 0.28 1.14
Total Pubs 79.93 84.78 43.71 47.72 62.00 71.30
Total Pats 11.02 16.21 0 0 5.57 12.77
13The scatter plot of patents versus publications for each inventor sample member (see Figure 4)
does not suggest any strong pattern between the two activities. Adjusting the publications and
patents for the number of active years of the faculty person during the sample does not result
in any strong pattern, but suggests a possible slight negative relationship (disregarding the one
outlier) with a few faculty members producing many patents few publications, and a few faculty
members doing the opposite (see Figure 5). The simple correlation between the total patents and
publications held by a researcher is 0.51. When adjusted for the number of active research years,
the correlation falls to 0.48, suggesting that little of the overall correlation is due to the number
of active research years of the inventor. The correlation of adjusted patents and papers is positive
and of considerable magnitude, indicating that inventors with a relatively high number of patents
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Figure 4: Scatterplot of Total Patents versus Total Publications Per Researcher
With this data, we aim to answer several questions. First, are there systematic diﬀerences
across faculty members that do and do not patent? Second, how is the publication activity of
a researcher related to patenting by that researcher? Does publication activity change following
inventor patenting? Third, is the relationship with publications diﬀerent for patents assigned to
universities, companies, or unassigned, or for important patents? Finally, are citations to publica-
tions related to patenting? The next section describes the empirical tests that we employ to answer
these questions and the results of these tests, as well as comparisons to the results of prior studies.
14Table 6: Correlations for Current and Lagged Publications and Patents
Pubt Pubt−1 Pubt−2 Pubt−3 Patst Patst−1 Patst−2 Patst−3
Pubt 1
Pubt−1 0.78 1
Pubt−2 0.77 0.78 1
Pubt−3 0.72 0.78 0.78 1
Patst 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.30 1
Patst−1 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.59 1
Patst−2 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.52 0.59 1
Patst−3 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.41 0.49 0.57 1
5 Empirical Analysis & Results
This rich data set provides us with the ability to investigate many questions relating to faculty
patenting and publication. Simple correlation coeﬃcients across all sample members tell the basic
story. There are signiﬁcant positive correlations between publications and lagged publications,
patents and lagged patents, publications and lagged patents, and patents and lagged publications
(See Table 6).
This suggests that researchers with more patents also have more publications. In order to
control for lifecycle, ﬁeld, and year eﬀects, we investigate the relationship between these two faculty
activities with regression analysis. We employ a research-level ﬁxed eﬀects model, estimating
the relationship between changes in a researcher’s annual publications and various measures of
that researcher’s patenting activity, controlling for ﬁeld, year, and the overall career pattern of
publication activity. This empirical strategy relies on a comparison of pre and post patenting
publication activity of inventors relative to patenting activity of non-inventors to identify changes
in publication activity associated with patenting. The fact that each inventor patents in a diﬀerent
year of his or her career allows us to distinguish between temporal shocks and changes associated
with patenting. In the following sections, we describe the empirical approach and results with
respect to the research questions outlined above.18
5.1 Diﬀerences Across Faculty Members
We ﬁrst consider diﬀerences between the samples of inventor and non-inventor faculty members
on average. Due to the count nature of the publication data, we employ a negative binomial
speciﬁcation.19 A negative binomial regression of the form:
18We match the timing of the patenting and publishing as well as possible with the existing information, using
the application year of the patent and the publication year of the publications. This is consistent with Agrawal and
Henderson [2002]. We test for sensitivity to the results using a one year adjustment in the data to shift the dating of
publications to one year before their publication to adjust (albeit arbitrarily) for the delay between submission and
publication of an article. These results are discussed below.
19We ﬁrst ran a Poisson speciﬁcation, but a test for over dispersion rejected the constraint of the Poisson model at
the 1% level, suggesting the need for the negative binomial speciﬁcation.
15E(Publicationsi,t|InventorID,Y earsSincePhd,Field,Y ear) =
exp{β1Y earsSincePhdi,t + β2InventorIDi
+ΣtαtY eart + ΣfγfFieldf} (1)
describes a reduced form of the observable determinants of publications in a year, where Publicationsi,t
is the number of publications in year t for researcher i, InventorID is a dummy variable equal to
one in all years for researchers that are ever listed as an inventor on a patent, Y eart is a year
dummy variable equal to one for publications in year t, Y earsSincePhdi,t is equal to the number
years since the PhD date for faculty person i in year t, and Fieldi is a dummy variable equal to 1
for faculty members in ﬁeld f. The ﬁelds of discipline for faculty in our sample are Mechanical En-
gineering, Computer Science / Electrical Engineering, Medical, Chemistry, Biomedical / Genetics
/ Microbiology, Chemical Engineering / Materials Science, Physics, Other Science, and Behavioral
/ Philosophy / Cognitive Science.20
Results are reported in Table 8. Several interesting results are evident. First, as one would
expect, the number of publications per year increases with the years since a researcher’s PhD date,
but at a decreasing rate over time.21 Second, conﬁrming the diﬀerence in means reported above,
inventors have, on average, signiﬁcantly more publications per year. Equation (2) also includes a
dummy variable equal to one in all years following the ﬁrst patent of an inventor, PostPat. As in
the diﬀerence of means test above, publications per year are signiﬁcantly greater following a faculty
member’s ﬁrst patent. The third equation replaces this dummy variable with the contemporaneous
count of patents, and demonstrates that researchers with more patents in a year also have more
publications, even controlling for inventor status. These results tell us that the inventors in our
sample are more proliﬁc in terms of annual publications than are their non-inventor colleagues.
Analogous estimations for the average number of citations to the researcher’s publications in
a year follow in Table 9.22 Inventors’ publications are cited more heavily, publications in years
following the ﬁrst patent by a faculty member are cited more heavily, and publications of those
researchers with more patents receive more citations. Equation (4) adds to the regressions controls
for the number of publications for the researcher-year observation and this value squared. This
allows the average number of citations per publication to vary with the publication productivity
of the researcher, controlling at least partially for the researcher’s current quality. As one might
expect, researchers with more publications also have more heavily cited publications, although this
positive relationship displays diminishing marginal eﬀects for high values of publications. With
20Note that the matching for the control sample was done on much more detailed ﬁelds, such as genetics or inorganic
chemistry.
21This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Levin and Stephan [1991] with respect to the publication life cycle of
academic researchers.
22The regressions for the average citations to publications are estimates using ordinary least squares, not as a
negative binomial model, because the dependent variable is not restricted to integers. The dependent variable in the
analysis is the natural log of the average number of citations to publications in year t.
16these controls, researchers who ever patent receive on average fewer citations per publication, but
publications in years in which an inventor applies for a patent receive on average more citations,
although this coeﬃcient is much smaller in magnitude than in equation (3). We investigate this
result more below.
These results taken together suggest that there are some consistent diﬀerences across faculty
members in the sample. In the following analyses, we control for the time invariant diﬀerence
between researchers with researcher level ﬁxed eﬀects and explore changes in publishing and citation
of publications over time within researcher.
5.2 Relationship Between Patenting and Publishing Activity
In this section, we examine whether or not there is any change in publication activity following
a patent by a researcher. As a ﬁrst look, we examine pre-patent and post-patent annual averages
of publications for faculty in the inventor sample. The mean publications per year for faculty
researchers prior to their ﬁrst patent is 2.62, while following their ﬁrst patent it is 5.29. This
diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This suggests a positive relationship between the
two researcher activities. However, this does not control for general life cycle pattern of publication
or common changes over time for inventors and non-inventors. The conditional mean of the negative
binomial publication function for researcher i in year t is:
E(Pubs|Patents,Y earsSincePhd,Y ear,FEi) =
exp{β1Y earsSincePhdi,t + β2PostPati,t + ΣtαtY eart + ΣiγiFEi} (2)
where Y eart, and Y earsSincePhdi,t are the same as above. PostPati,t is a dummy equal to
one in all years following the faculty person’s ﬁrst patent application. In some speciﬁcations we
replace the PostPati,t dummy variable with either a variable equal to the log of the number
of patents in the current year, Patsi,t, or the log of the cumulative number of patents held by
the inventor, PriorPatsi,t, and the square of this term. The FEi term is a dummy equal to
one for researcher i (i=1 to 300). The inclusion of researcher-level ﬁxed eﬀects controls for the
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity between researchers in the sample. This controls for the
average number of annual publications of the researcher, and eﬀectively makes the estimation
one of diﬀerences from the researcher-mean.23 However, this does not control for unobserved
characteristics of the researchers that change over time.
As a dependent variable, we employ the number of publications in year t by researcher i. A
z-test for signiﬁcance of exp(β2) tests the indicates the signiﬁcance of a within-researcher diﬀerence
in publishing before and after a patent (or the number of prior patents). Inclusion of the non-
patenting control sample members improves the estimation of the lifecycle of publication described
by the years since PhD variables, and also helps estimate the average year eﬀects. For example, if
23We drop the ﬁeld indicators because they are time-invariant for a given researcher.
17the number of journals in a ﬁeld is increasing or decreasing overtime, the number of patents of the
matched inventor and control sample researchers will be aﬀected similarly.24
Table 10 reports the results using researcher ﬁxed eﬀects analysis for researcher publications.
In all equations, the lifecycle pattern (i.e. the relationship between years since PhD and pub-
lications) is the same as above. In the ﬁrst equation, the Post-Patent coeﬃcient is positive and
signiﬁcant, indicating that after controlling for time-invariant unobserved researcher characteristics,
publications per year are greater following a researcher’s ﬁrst patent by 20%. The second equation
includes the log of the current-year patents by the researcher, the coeﬃcient of which is positive
and signiﬁcant. This coeﬃcient suggests that doubling the number of patents by an inventor in
a year is associated with a 10% increase in publications in that year.25 Equation (3) reports the
results using the cumulative count of patents by the researcher through the prior year, and this
term squared. Both coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, and together suggest that the positive relationship
between patenting and publishing diminishes at high levels of patenting, tracing out an inverted-U
shaped relationship. In this case, the relationship between patenting and publishing is increasing
until the peak at approximately 9 patents, and remains positive until approximately 71 cumulative
patents for the researcher.26 This suggests that researcher publications increase with prior patents,
but at a diminishing rate. These results indicate that the number of publication is not lower, and
in fact appears to be higher, following a patent by a researcher.
The researcher-level ﬁxed eﬀects can not capture unobserved, within researcher changes over
time. This may be of concern if, for example, the number of applied research journals is increasing
faster over time than the number of theoretical research journals, and patenting faculty members
tend to do more applied work. If this were the case, we would expect to see publications by faculty
members doing applied work (and patenting) increase over time. This would not be captured in the
year eﬀects, because those capture only the average year eﬀect for the entire sample. To account for
the possibility of diﬀering year eﬀects for the inventors and non-inventors, I re-estimated equation
(2) using year eﬀects interacted with an inventor dummy equal to one in all years for inventors.
This inclusion does not change the result substantially, as reported in equation (4) in Table 10.
5.2.1 Variation in Patents
To explore these results further, we attempted to include more detailed information about the
patents held by these researchers. The ﬁrst method we employ is to characterize the patent as either
university assigned, industry assigned, or unassigned. One might expect that university-assigned
patents are more complementary to the faculty member’s academic research, and so these patents
might be associated with more publishing. Industry-assigned patents may represent a deviation
from traditionally academic science, or may be associated with more of a drain on the researcher’s
24Note that for members of the control sample, the patenting variables are always equal to zero.
25This may sound like an incredibly large increase, but a doubling in the number of patents would represent a
very large increase in patents since the mean number of patents per year is only 0.28 for the sample and 0.56 for the
inventors in the sample.
26The same relationship holds when we exclude the outlier with more than 100 patents during the period.
18time. However, as discussed above, industry-assigned patents by the researcher may be associated
with more industry interaction, which could prompt further research questions and may result in
more publications. The second method is to identify important patents by comparing the number
of forward citations received by the patent to other patents in the same technology class and
application year.27 Patents that received a number of citations greater than the mean plus one half
the standard deviation of the number of cites for patents in its technology class-application year
were deemed important. For the inventors in our sample, there were 194 important patents, or 25%
of the patents in the sample applied for by the end of 1990.28 Patents that generate more citations
may represent more important discoveries, which are more likely to provide the potential beneﬁts
of patenting described above: more funding and industry interaction. However, it is also true
the the non-causal explanations associated with a positive relationship are more likely to be true
for important patents: researchers with very successful research are likely to have both important
patents and more publications.
We repeated the ﬁxed eﬀects regressions described above with these detailed counts of patents,
and results are reported in Tables 11 and 12. In Table 11, equation (1) includes three dummy
variables indicating the pre/post patent measure for university, industry, and unassigned patents.29
Interestingly, the only signiﬁcant and positive coeﬃcient is on the university patent variable. In
equation (2), the variables of interest measure log of the number of patents of each type in the
current year. Again, university patents are the only type with a positive relationship with current
publications. Equation (3) includes variables measuring the cumulative number of each of the
three types of patents and the square of this measure. Again, the most signiﬁcant eﬀect is from the
university-assigned patents, and the diminishing marginal eﬀects described above is present. From
this analysis, it is apparent that publications do not have the same relationship with all types of
patents. However, this analysis does have the limitation that 76% of the patents by inventors in
the sample were university assigned, so estimation of the coeﬃcient on the industry and unassigned
patent may be not well identiﬁed.
Table 12 reports the results using the counts of important patents. These results are comparable
to equations (4) and (5) in Table 10. Equation (1) reports the results using the log of the number
of concurrent important patents. The coeﬃcient is positive, but is not diﬀerent from the coeﬃcient
reported above for all patents. Equation (2) includes both the important patents and all patents
in the current year. There coeﬃcients are jointly signiﬁcant at the 5% level and suggest that
important patents are associated with a larger increase in publications than is the average patent
of the faculty members. Equation (3) includes the cumulative number of important patents and
27A ﬁve-year window was used to evaluate the number of forward citations for each patent, and the comparison
was made to all patents in the technology class-application year, not just those by inventors in the sample.
28Note that the sample for the analysis of important patents is limited to patents applied for by the end of 1990 in
order to allow the ﬁve year window without running into right truncation in the data. In the overall population of
patents, 13% of patents meet this criteria for important patents.
29Note that these variables diﬀer in a time dimension for a given research. If that researcher patents on a university-
assigned patent ﬁrst, and later patents on an industry assigned patent, the industry patent variable is switched to
one at the later time period.
19this value squared. Prior important patents are both signiﬁcantly and positively related to annual
publishing, and the coeﬃcient is much larger than that of the cumulative number of patents reported
in Table 10. This result holds even when we also include all prior patents (important and not), as
reported in equation (4). In fact, the coeﬃcients on the count of all patents and this value squared
are insigniﬁcant, suggesting that the important patents are driving the result above. The count
of publications by a faculty member in a year is signiﬁcantly positively related to the important
patents by that researcher.
5.3 Citations to Publications
One of our research questions described above was whether or not there was any change in
citations to the published research of a faculty person following patenting. If patent disclosures
serve as an additional means of facilitating diﬀusion of research, or if the property right to the
research encourages follow-on research resulting in more follow-on publications, publications by an
inventor may receive more citations following a patent. On the other hand, if patents negatively
aﬀect the quality of the published research or if patenting decreases follow-on research due to
property rights concerns, the opposite relationship may hold. Limitations on the use of patented
research will inhibit follow-on research, and thus publications related to patented research may be
cited less. The implicit null hypothesis is that citations to a researcher’s publications are unrelated
to the patent activity of the researcher. In order to test this hypothesis, we collected data on the
number of citations to publications in each year by each of the sample researchers. Our unit of
analysis remains the research-year, so the dependent variable employed is the average number of
citations per publication per year.30 The general form of the model is as follows:
ln(AvgCitesi,t) = β1Y earsSincePhdi,t + β2PostPati,t + αtY eart + γiFEi + i,t (3)
Results are reported in Table 13. Results in equation (1) suggest that, controlling for the
researcher’s average citations per publication (using the researcher ﬁxed eﬀects), citations per
publication following an inventor’s ﬁrst patent are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than prior to the
patent (the coeﬃcient is positive, but not highly signiﬁcant). Equation (2) includes the log of
contemporaneous patents, and demonstrates that average citation of publications is signiﬁcantly
greater for publications in the same year as a patent application. Equation (3) considers the
relationship between average citations and cumulative prior patents. We see the same inverted-
U pattern noted above, although the coeﬃcient on the linear term is signiﬁcant only at the 7%
level. The positive relationship with prior patents is smaller here, and the negative eﬀect of the
squared term larger, than in the analysis of publications discussed above. The peak of the net
positive relationship with cumulative prior patents is at only three cumulative patents, and the
net eﬀect becomes negative at nine cumulative patents. If interpreted causally, this result implies
30This is calculated as the total number of citations received as of May, 2003, for publications made in that year
divided by the number of publications made in that year for each researcher.
20that after 9 patents by a researcher, the average number of citations to his or her publications is
lower than it would have been without any patenting. At lower levels of patenting, where most of
the faculty inventors reside, this argues against any decrease in citation to publications following
patenting. However, the more intensive patenters appear to experience a decline in average citations
to publications, perhaps reﬂecting limitations to follow-on research due to intellectual property
concerns.
Equations (4) and (5) in the same table control for publication activity of the research, using
the number of publications by the researcher in the current year and this value squared. This is
particularly appropriate for the citation analysis because (a) the count of publications will help
control for time-varying researcher quality, and (b) extremely proliﬁc researchers may contribute
less value added with each additional publication, and therefore these later publications may be
cited less. As the results indicate, average citations to publications are greater in years with more
publications, and this relationship displays a diminishing marginal eﬀect. These controls are signiﬁ-
cant and reduce the lifecycle control variables, since they capture some of the same eﬀect. Inclusion
of these variables does not diminish the positive relationship between contemporaneous patenting
and citations to a researcher’s publications (equation 4), but the relationship with cumulative past
patenting is not signiﬁcant (equation 5). The lack of signiﬁcance of past patenting for citations to
publications suggests that the positive association between patenting and citations is short lived or
restricted to contemporaneous publications. We explore this further below.
5.4 Comparison to Other Work
Agrawal and Henderson [2002] do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between the number of
publications and the past patenting activity of the researchers investigated at MIT, but do ﬁnd
a positive relationship between prior patents and citations to publications. In order to compare
results with our sample to their analysis, we estimate several equations similar to the results
they report. For the publication analysis, Agrawal and Henderson [2002] estimate regressions
including the lagged number of publications for each researcher, presumably in order to better
predict what the current number of publications would be. Lagged publications predict researcher
productivity (in terms of publications) more accurately than the researcher ﬁxed eﬀect because
they capture changes over time in research quality or activity level. As the correlations in Table 6
demonstrate, publications are strongly related to lagged publications. By including the lagged
publications in ﬁxed eﬀects regression of publications on patenting, the patenting variable can only
pick up remaining variation in the number of current publications that is not related to lagged
publications.31
The results of the comparison equations for publications are reported in Table 14. Lagged
publications are signiﬁcant predictors of current publications. Including these lagged publication
counts decreases the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on the patenting variable, but does not eliminate
31Fixed eﬀects analysis with lagged dependent variables may result in biased estimates of the coeﬃcients, and is
especially a problem with count data models (see Blundell et al. [2002] and Wooldridge [2000]). We include these
estimates here for comparison with Agrawal and Henderson [2002].
21the signiﬁcant positive relationship between patenting and publishing. Equation (2) reﬂects the
estimation in Agrawal and Henderson as closely as our data allow, and the positive coeﬃcient on
the patenting variable remains signiﬁcant.
For the analysis of citations to publications, Agrawal and Henderson regress the depreciated
stock of citations on the depreciation stock of papers and the depreciated stock of patents.32 They
ﬁnd a positive coeﬃcient on this measure of patenting activity. Equation (1) in Table 15 provides a
comparable analysis with our dataset. The coeﬃcient on the depreciated stock of patents is positive
and signiﬁcant, in agreement with Agrawal and Henderson’s results. Equation (2) substitutes
the depreciated stock of patents through the prior year in place of the measure including the
current year to further explore the result described above. As above, when the current year’s
patents are excluded, the patenting measure is not signiﬁcantly predictive of citations to current
publications. In many cases, publications in the current year reﬂect submissions for publication
from the prior year, which are likely related to the patent applications of the prior year. Equation
(3) uses the speciﬁcation from equation (1), but also includes the current-year publications of the
researcher. Including this measure of current researcher activity eliminates the relationship between
the depreciated stock of patents and depreciated stock of paper citations. Therefore, not only is
the assumption about timing critical to the empirical results and interpretation, the inclusion of
the current publications changes the results as well. Perhaps the depreciated stock of papers (as
used by Agrawal and Henderson) does not reﬂect current “quality” of the researcher’s publications
as well as the current count of publications.
Equation (4) mimics the analysis in the prior table, using current and lagged patents and lagged
publications, and a dependent variable of average future citations to publications in the current
year. Recent publications are highly correlated with average citations to current publications,
perhaps reﬂecting the recent quality of the researcher. With these controls, current patents are
not predictive of average citations to publications. Equation (5) adds to these controls the current
number of publications. Current publications are highly signiﬁcant, but current patents are not
signiﬁcant at all. Interestingly, patents lagged one or three years are signiﬁcant and negative (a
point to which we will return shortly). This suggests that the citation of current publications may
be more related to recent publication activity than to patenting.
Therefore, our results are somewhat contradictory to the results presented by Agrawal and
Henderson. In our sample, faculty members that patent subsequently publish more, and publish
increasingly more with more patents, although at a decreasing rate. Citations to publications do
appear to increase, but the increase is related more to faculty publications than patents, and the
timing of this increase suggests that the interpretation is tricky. More analysis, with data detailing
which publications are associated with intellectual property rights, is needed to explore this result.
In the next section, we do a limited analysis exploring the timing issue further.
32Agrawal and Henderson use a 20% annual depreciation rate, and include citations, papers, and patents through
the current year. We do the same here.
225.5 Sensitivity to Timing
The results above cast doubt on any hypothesized relationship between faculty patenting activity
and citation to his or her publications. Recall the timing of patents and publications employed here
and in the Agrawal and Henderson results: patent application years are matched to publication
years because those are the dates available. This fails to take account of the lag time between
submission of a publication and the publication date. If publications this year actually represent
publications submitted last year (as is no doubt the case for some of the publications in the sample),
then the publications truly contemporaneous with this year’s patent applications are published next
year. Or, said another way, patent applications from last year are contemporaneous with this year’s
publications.
We re-estimate the basic regressions using the lagged patents in place of current-year patents.
Results are reported in Table 16. As the ﬁrst equation demonstrates, the positive relationship
between patenting and publications remains. The coeﬃcient on patents from the year prior to the
publication date is smaller than we reported above, but the positive and signiﬁcant result maintains.
This coeﬃcient suggests that for a doubling in the number of patents in the prior year, the number
of publications this year is about 5% greater.
The results for the estimations of average citations, however, do not suggest any relationship
between patents in one year and the number of citations received by publications the following
year. These results reinforce the concern regarding the possible mis-interpretation of the positive
coeﬃcient on current patents in the earlier regressions of average citations. There is certainly not
overwhelming evidence that average citations to publication increase as a faculty members patent
their research results.
6 Conclusion
As patenting by university researchers has grown, so has concern about the possible negative
eﬀects on the historically open nature of university research. The relationship between university
researchers and industry researchers that use university research results as inputs to their research
has certainly changed over the last quarter century. How the change in norms has impacted the
open publication and use of university research results is a matter of concern for policy makers and
ﬁrm managers in need of accessing university research results.
This research contributes to the existing literature by providing an empirical investigation of
faculty patenting and publishing with a dataset containing inventors from multiple ﬁelds at many
institutions across many years. The results presented here suggest that the open publication of
university research results is not inhibited by patenting by university faculty members. The annual
number of publications by a faculty member increases following application for a successful patent,
controlling for ﬁeld, year, and time proﬁle of publications by matched non-inventors. A doubling in
the number of patents by a researcher is associated with a 5-10% increase in annual publications.
Furthermore, the detailed consideration of patenting suggests that not all patents are created
23equal, at least in terms of their relationship with faculty publications. University-assigned and
very important patents are associated with signiﬁcantly higher numbers of annual publications by
the patenting faculty member. Results here also point to the diminishing beneﬁts to patenting for
faculty members that are repeat patenters.
The relationship between patenting and citations to publications is more complicated. With
the this dataset, matching the timing of a publication submission and a patent application is not
possible, and we have no information by which to connect papers to associated patents. The results
discussed above suggest that there is not a signiﬁcant relationship between patenting and citations
to a faculty member’s publications. This may suggest countervailing eﬀects of increased diﬀusion
of patented research, which would increase citations to patent-related publications, and limits to
follow-on research due to exclusive property rights related to patented research. Further research
with a dataset that allows matching between published and patented research is needed to explore
this relationship and the possibility that follow-on research may be limited due to patent protection.
Stern and Murray [2004] present some interesting results in this area that suggest citations to papers
decrease when a patent related to the same research is granted.
If one assumes for a moment that all patented research are also published, which is not unlikely
given the incentives of faculty members to publish results, these results suggest further interpreta-
tion. The analysis presented above suggests that faculty publications are increasing with patenting,
by approximately 20% or less than 1 publication for the mean inventor. Making the admittedly
strong assumption (for expositional purposes) that patented research also published (or publish-
able), this suggests that there is indeed some loss of openly published and non-patented research
results and patenting increases. Therefore, the use of these results in follow-on research may be
restricted, although we can not test for that directly. In addition, the analysis here can not capture
any of the potential delay of publication associated with patenting that has been suggested by
anecdotal evidence.
Why is faculty patenting associated with more faculty publications? One interpretation is that
successful research generates both patents and publications. In addition, limited anecdotal evidence
suggests that interaction with industry pushes faculty research forward and sparks new research
ideas. Funding from industry sources and money from licensing revenue may help researchers fund
more research activities, hire researchers, and purchase new lab equipment. Perhaps one reason
that the publication-count results presented here diﬀer from those of a similar empirical exercise
for MIT faculty is that MIT faculty may not by as constrained by limited funding as researchers at
other schools may be. Based on the evidence presented here, and the results presented by Agrawal
and Henderson [2002], increasing the incentives to patent research results does not seem to be out
overwhelming the incentives for faculty members to publish their research.
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Figure 5: Scatterplot of Adjusted Total Patents versus Adjusted Total Publications Per Researcher
28Table 7: Summary Statistics for Full Sample, Inventor Sample, and Non-Inventor Sample
Full Sample Inventors Non-Inventors
Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev
Annual Pubs 3.12 4.32 3.99 5.18 2.24 2.96
Cites/Pub 31.07 118.32 34.92 109.33 27.13 126.73
Cum. Pubs 28.75 46.24 36.57 56.57 20.78 30.49
Annual Pats 0.28 1.13 0.56 1.54 0 0
Annual Univ. Pats 0.22 0.98 0.43 1.35 0 0
Annual Ind. Pats 0.05 0.41 0.10 0.58 0 0
Annual Unas. Pats 0.02 0.18 0.03 0.25 0 0
Annual Imp. Pats 0.04 0.27 0.08 0.37 0 0
Cum. Pats 0.34 1.27 0.67 1.72 0 0
Yrs Since Phd 14.62 9.42 14.87 9.54 14.37 9.29










yrssincephd 0.110 0.105 0.104
(0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)**
yrssincephd2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
Constant -0.457 -0.321 -0.370
(0.127)** (0.126)* (0.120)**
Observations 5461 5461 5461
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * signiﬁ-
cant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
All equations include ﬁeld and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
29Table 9: Citations to Publications - Pooled Results
ln(Cites/Pub) ln(Cites/Pub) ln(Cites/Pub) ln(Cites/Pub)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
inventor ID 0.350 0.289 0.230 -0.110










yrssincephd 0.098 0.096 0.094 -0.008
(0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.005)
yrssincephd2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)
Constant 1.815 1.862 1.891 0.847
(0.176)** (0.178)** (0.175)** (0.109)**
Observations 5461 5461 5461 5461
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.67
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
All equations include ﬁeld and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
30Table 10: Patenting and Publishing - Fixed Eﬀects Results
#Pubs #Pubs #Pubs #Pubs











yrssincephd 0.103 0.105 0.103 0.110
(0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)**
yrssincephd
2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
Constant 0.658 0.625 0.663 1.073
(0.102)** (0.101)** (0.101)** (0.158)**
Observations 5461 5461 5461 5461
Standard errors in parentheses; * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant
at 1%.
All equations include ﬁeld, year, and researcher ﬁxed eﬀects.
Equation (4) includes year eﬀects interacted with an inventor in-
dicator.


































yrssincephd 0.104 0.107 0.104
(0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)**
yrssincephd
2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
Constant 0.654 0.632 0.660
(0.102)** (0.101)** (0.102)**
Observations 5461 5461 5461
Standard errors in parentheses; * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** sig-
niﬁcant at 1%.
All equations include ﬁeld, year, and researcher ﬁxed eﬀects.
32Table 12: Fixed Eﬀects Results With Patent Importance
#Pubs #Pubs #Pubs #Pubs

















yrssincephd 0.137 0.136 0.135 0.136
(0.011)** (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.011)**
yrssincephd
2 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
Constant 0.663 0.668 0.688 0.684
(0.123)** (0.123)** (0.123)** (0.123)**
Observations 3928 3928 3928 3928
Standard errors in parentheses; * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at
1%.
All equations include ﬁeld, year, and researcher ﬁxed eﬀects.
33Table 13: Regressions of the Citations to Publications
ln(Cites/Pub) ln(Cites/Pub) ln(Cites/Pub) ln(Cites/Pub) ln(Cites/Pub)

















yrssincephd 0.108 0.109 0.111 -0.008 -0.005
(0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.006) (0.006)
yrssincephd
2 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)*
Constant 1.626 1.615 1.607 0.549 0.528
(0.123)** (0.122)** (0.123)** (0.079)** (0.080)**
Observations 5461 5461 5461 5461 5461
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.62 0.62
Standard errors in parentheses; * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
All equations include ﬁeld and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Equations (3)-(5) include researcher ﬁxed eﬀects.


























Standard errors in parentheses; * sig-
niﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
All equations include ﬁeld, year, and
researcher ﬁxed eﬀects.
35Table 15: Comparison to Agrawal & Henderson Results
ln(Cites/Pub) ln(Cites/Pub) ln(Cites/Pub) ln(Cites/Pub) ln(Cites/Pub)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)






















yrssincephd -0.035 -0.049 -0.001 0.085 0.024
(0.006)** (0.007)** (0.005) (0.012)** (0.010)*
yrssincephd
2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.000)** (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
Constant -0.880 -1.327 -1.126 1.325 0.804
(0.073)** (0.072)** (0.057)** (0.145)** (0.115)**
Observations 5461 4560 5461 4561 4561
R-squared 0.05 0.41
Standard errors in parentheses; * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
All equations include ﬁeld, year, and researcher ﬁxed eﬀects.
36Table 16: Sensitivity to Timing of Patents
#Pubs ln(Cites/Pub) ln(Cites/Pub) ln(Cites/Pub)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(pats)t−1 0.069 -0.030 0.018 0.000













yrssincephd 0.104 0.118 0.050 -0.002
(0.008)** (0.010)** (0.015)** (0.007)
yrssincephd
2 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.000
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)*
Constant 0.757 1.413 1.407 0.450
(0.105)** (0.129)** (0.135)** (0.084)**
Observations 5161 5161 5161 5161
R-squared 0.06 0.08 0.61
Standard errors in parentheses; * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
All equations include ﬁeld, year, and researcher ﬁxed eﬀects.
37